Collaborative Capability Design: Redundancy of Potentialities by Selsky, John W. et al.
  
COLLABORATIVE CAPABILITY DESIGN: REDUNDANCY OF POTENTIALITIES
1
 
 
 
 
 
John W. Selsky (contact) 
University of South Florida  
College of Business 
3433 Winter Lake Road 
Lakeland, FL 33803  USA 
+1-863-667-7718 
jselsky@usf.edu 
 
 
Rafael Ramirez, Oxford University, UK  
Rafael.Ramirez@sbs.ox.ac.uk 
 
 
Oğuz N. Babüroğlu, Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey 
baburoglu@sabanciuniv.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
re-submitted for consideration to 
Systemic Practice and Action Research 
October 2012 
(original submission March 2012) 
                                                 
1 A much earlier version of this paper was delivered at a symposium on New directions in socio-
ecological thinking: Legacies of Emery and Trist, Academy of Management national meetings, 
Philadelphia, August 2007. The authors thank Don de Guerre, Merrelyn Emery, Del Nagy, Bill 
Starbuck and participants in a USF Tampa Management Department faculty seminar for 
comments on earlier versions. 
 
 2 
Collaborative capability design: Redundancy of potentialities 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we extend the core socio-ecological concept of two contrasting design 
principles applicable to all work systems. Reframing those design principles as strategic as 
well as operational choices leads us to propose a third design principle, Design Principle 3 
(DP3), which has remained undeveloped in social ecology. We call this design principle 
Redundancy of Potentialities and demonstrate its application in transorganizational work 
systems. We argue that DP3 is at the core of socio-ecological practice and is therefore 
appropriate for coping with the highly turbulent environments now experienced in many 
industries and fields. We offer several illustrations of DP3 in practice and draw implications 
for enhancing capabilities for creative collaboration in inter-organizational fields through 
deliberate attention to design. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Interlinked global crises exist today, including climate change, the viability of the 
Euro, stalled growth in the OECD, growing inequality and peak oil. These crises are multi-
faceted, manifesting in economic, political, institutional, ecological and cultural spheres. The 
crises have long been experienced in ‘peripheral’ countries of the developing world, but 
since the advent of the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008 the ‘core’ countries of the first 
world have experienced them too, often in unexpected ways. The GFC was produced by 
core ‘developed world’ institutions, as is evident in the way those institutions have been 
working since the eruption of the GFC. Because the multifaceted crises have infected the 
core institutions of even the largest developed nations, they now threaten the entire world. 
 No central institution (e.g., the UN, US Federal Reserve, IMF, European Central 
Bank, NATO) or combination of them has found the capacity to deal with these crises in a 
holistic way. As of this writing (October 2012), in the EU the central bank is prevented from 
acting as the lender of last resort to ameliorate the eurozone debt crisis, but even if it were 
able to act in that capacity, it is not certain that the ECB would be effective given the 
cumbersome nature of the EU governance system. The US political system is gridlocked, 
and its lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve Bank, has bumped up against the limits of 
its traditional monetarist tools. 
 Why has the GFC hit with such intensity and breadth? Some commentators have 
asserted that the global economic/political meta-system is very crisis-prone (Beck and 
Holzer, 2007; Homer-Dixon, 2006). Individual sub-systems within the global meta-system 
appear to be subject to more frequent and more intense disruptions. These impinge from 
various sources in the environment, such as attempts by players in an industry to gain 
competititve advantage by destroying the conventional bases of competition, which spin out 
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of control; intentional attempts to ‘jolt’ a field or industry; and natural or man-made disasters 
(Selsky and McCann, 2010: 172-173).  
 This predicament of sudden macro-level, or contextual, change with insufficient 
coping capacity in organizations and institutions creates the fertile ground for this paper. We 
argue that the global crises sketched above may usefully be understood and analyzed as a 
design crisis brought about by the persistence of environmental turbulence. This design 
crisis evokes new arenas of risk and opportunity.  
 Ever since Herbert Simon (1969) identified the ‘sciences of the artificial’ as a design 
challenge, systems and organizational scholars have attended to this approach. Building on 
Churchman’s (1971) work on ‘designing inquiring systems,’ Ackoff adopted a design 
approach in his work on redesigning the future (1975) and the corporation (1999). Recent 
organizational research on design finds salient connections among design, capabilities and 
strategy (Normann and Ramirez, 1993, 1994; Dunbar and Starbuck, 2006; Greenwood and 
Miller, 2010; Pascal, Thomas and Romme, 2012). At the inter-organizational level a design 
approach has been evident for some time (see Ackoff, 1975; Cummings, 1984). Van de Ven 
and Hargrave (2004: 264) trace the notion of institutional design – that is, “view[ing] 
institutions [as] a reflection of conscious, intentional decisions and actions” – to the work of 
J.R. Commons in the 1920-1930s. However, design at the inter-organizational level requires 
further development. In this paper we seek to contribute to this effort within the conceptual 
context of social ecology. We do so by reframing the original Emery design principles 
(1967) so that they are as responsive as possible to today’s turbulent environment. 
 Social ecology, or the socio-ecological perspective, is a school in organization 
studies whose origins lie in the work of Fred Emery, Eric Trist and others on the relations 
between systems and environments (see Emery, 1999, 2000; Selsky, Goes and Baburoglu, 
2007; Ramirez, Selsky, van der Heijden, 2010). In this paper we focus on an important 
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class of systems, namely, inter-organizational fields, and their constituent parts, namely, 
complex organizations and their transactions with their environments. According to social 
ecology, a set of systems (for our purposes, organizations), the transactions among them, 
and their relevant environments constitute a social field; examples of such fields are the 
higher education sector in Florida, the Mexican cement industry, and the multi-sectoral set 
of organizations devoted to dealing with AIDS in Africa or with global climate change. Social 
ecology holds that field-level (rather than organization-level) interventions are required to 
address the contextual disturbances which erupt in social fields, such as those manifested 
in the crises described above. But the structuring of such fields tends to be weak and ad 
hoc (Trist 1977; McCann, 1983), so an important question is, what is the principle, or basis, 
for the design of large-scale fields? Echoing Emery (1969) and Barton and Selsky (2000), 
we inquire as to how social ecology might inform the design thinking needed for the 
regulation of inter-organizational fields. 
 Given recent calls for organizational research to be re-thought as design science 
(e.g., Greenwood and Miller, 2010), social ecology has the potential for increased salience 
and impact. The starting point is the legacy of Fred Emery (1967) and Merrelyn Emery 
(1999, 2000), who identified and elaborated the two organization design principles: 
Redundancy of Parts and Redundancy of Functions. Although Merrelyn Emery (1999) 
considers them to be “complete and exhaustive,” we argue that a third design principle, 
made visible by the reframing we undertake in this paper, may help to advance 
understanding of how work systems spanning across organizations, or “trans-organizations” 
(Cummings, 1984; Motamedi, 2012), either currently are or potentially could be designed.  
 In this paper we attempt to introduce the Emery legacy of design principles into 
current debates about the design of inter-organizational fields to foster creative 
collaboration. In the next section we outline the broad context for this issue in terms of 
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turbulence and collaborative responses to it. We argue that a third design principle is at the 
core of socio-ecological practice and is particularly appropriate for the turbulent (Emery and 
Trist, 1965; McCann and Selsky, 1984), vortical (Baburoglu, 1988) and ‘hyper’ (Selsky et 
al., 2007) environments now experienced in many industries and public policy sectors. We 
then offer contrasting perspectives on how value is created in inter-organizational fields, 
which provides a platform for discussing knowledge-based collective capabilities. We then 
explore the meaning and function of the Emery design principles, and identify an area of 
practice where those design principles may be extended, namely, into trans-organizational 
work systems and into the future potential of such systems. This leads us to identify system 
requirements for a third design principle, then to outline its contours. We call this new 
design principle Redundancy of Potentialities. We offer two illustrations of it in practice, then 
draw implications for enhancing capabilities for creative collaboration in inter-organizational 
fields through attention to the design of trans-organizational work systems. 
 
2. TURBULENCE AND CREATIVE COLLABORATION 
 We believe a third design principle needs to be articulated because turbulence, the 
need for collaborative endeavors to cope with it, the burgeoning array of collaborative 
arrangements and the increasing number of social system failures call for a reframing of the 
original two design principles. Apple’s controversy regarding outsourcing to Chinese 
subcontractor Foxconn illustrates the importance of these phenomena (New York Times, 22 
and 26 January 2012). Apple became embroiled in public controversy involving global 
supply chains, intensive industry competition at a global level, greater scrutiny made 
possible by social media, shifting expectations regarding MNCs’ social responsibilities, and 
other high-level drivers. 
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 In social ecology “[e]nvironments are conceptualized as ‘extended social field[s]… 
with a causal texture’ (Emery, 2000: 625). The causal texture is an emergent property of the 
whole field and affects the behaviour of all systems within it. It is produced by the 
interactions of the social actors inhabiting the same field plus the effects of external forces 
acting on those actors” (Selsky et al., 2007: 74). Most contemporary studies using a socio-
ecological perspective, including this one, use the texture called the turbulent field as a 
touchstone. The high relevant uncertainty produced by a turbulent field for those in it 
penetrates organizations, seriously affecting their ability to strategize effectively and achieve 
their goals. Emery and Trist (1965) suggested that the volatility of the turbulent field would 
or should lead organizations to engage in collaborative endeavors to address it.  
 Indeed, collaborative inter-organizational arrangements have exhibited significant 
growth during the past thirty years. Arguably as a response to growing turbulence in 
contextual environments, many industries and sectors are now well populated with a 
panoply of NGOs, QUANGOs, task-forces, working groups, think-tanks, coalitions, industry 
associations, federations, consortia, alliances, partnerships, joint ventures, platforms, 
commissions of inquiry, and other collaborative structures. The recent explosion of virtual 
and on-line collaborative arrangements – peer-to-peer, open source, copy-left, etc. – have 
added to this list. It would appear that Trist’s (1977) lament of weak structuring between the 
agencies of the state and the single organization is being redressed. 
 In the wake of the burgeoning of these ‘in-between’ structures and studies of them, 
some researchers have examined collective capabilities and the designs and governance 
structures associated with them (see Normann and Ramirez, 1993; Clegg et al., 2002; and 
the papers in Beyerlein et al., 2004, 2005). Davis and Marquis (2005) reviewed studies that 
explicitly or implicitly consider field-level capabilities; and Meyer, Gaba and Colwell (2005) 
reviewed a set of Meyer’s studies of nonlinear change in various fields. In the innovation 
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literature, Sawhney and Prandelli (2000) propose a clan-based governance form for 
innovation, which they call a “community of creation”, that acknowledges that “[t]he locus of 
innovation is no longer within the firm; it is within a community of members in an opportunity 
arena” (Selsky et al., 2005: 26), such as a regional biotechnology field or an open-source 
software network. Powell et al.’s (1996) landmark study of the biotechnology industry found 
the locus of innovation to be the network of learning, not the individual firm. The open-
source software community, which we refer to in Section 6 below, has been used to 
understand how innovation emerges and develops in a field (von Hippel and von Krogh, 
2003; Weber, 2004). In addition, Dougherty and Dunne (2011) have proposed that 
“ecologies” of private and public organizations be brought together to catalyze field-level 
emergence for “complex innovation” to address major societal problems. 
 Thus, a number of studies in several literature areas have examined collaborative 
capabilities and the structures associated with them. However, no one so far as we know 
has delved into the design principle(s) that underlie them. Our intent is to inquire whether 
these inter-organizational, field-level developments warrant the identification of a third 
design principle that we argue is already in widespread practice. As such, it is not a new 
principle, but a principle-in-use that we bring to attention and connect to the existing body of 
knowledge. 
 
3. PERSPECTIVES ON VALUE CREATION 
 Normann and Ramirez (1989, 1994) view offerings as the links co-produced 
between economic players that enable the ‘supplier’ (a player defined as such by the role it 
plays within a specific offering linking it to another player or players) to help the ‘client’ 
(idem.) to be a more effective or efficient value creator. In the Normann-Ramirez framework 
the value of a given offering for a given ‘client’ is only apparent to that client in the context of 
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other ‘offering’ relationships s/he engages in. The same applies to any given ‘supplier’. 
Value and values are thus considered to be co-produced (Ramirez, 1999) not only among 
players but among interactions (or ‘offerings’), and they are contingent on the network of 
offering relations any one player enters into. This ‘co-producer perspective’ differs from a 
more conventional value production perspective captured in the sequential value chain 
concept popularized by Michael Porter (1985). Recently, Vargo and Lusch (2004, 2006, 
2008), in highly cited articles on “service dominant logic” (SDL), go beyond Normann and 
Ramirez in stating that all transactions are, or should be, dominated by a services 
perspective, displacing what they see as a “goods dominant logic” which has captured the 
mindset of strategists for decades. A related development is Jim Spohrer’s IBM-driven 
initiative of “service science” (SS), which attempts to carve out a distinctive inter-disciplinary 
field to study and promote services research. Both SDL and SS acknowledge the important 
role of Normann and Ramirez’s notion of interactive strategy when studying how service 
logic has extended to non-service fields. In this alternative view, the service-inspired co-
production logic of interactive strategy is a more useful and more widely applicable heuristic 
than the value chain for furthering understanding of how value is created in complex and 
fast-changing settings. 
 The potential for any player to have the role of, and in that sense become, a 
‘supplier’ or ‘client’ lies in the potential offering links the player wants to enact and wants to 
invite his/her counterparts to enact. Such links are win-win based on a ‘dialogue’ (Bohm, 
1996: 6). Dialogue never has been a zero sum game; in dialogue everybody wins if anyone 
wins. In other words, the more connections the player engages in, and the larger the 
number of connections s/he promises to bring in, the more value s/he will co-generate. This 
is presumably why people join various social media and other on-line networking platforms 
like Facebook or LinkedIn; those services promise to enhance the social capital of an 
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individual member, building on the wealth potentially created by the ‘strength of weak ties’ 
(Granovetter, 1985) in interpersonal networks. In the same way, ex-prime ministers and 
other senior public figures get hired at high prices by investment banks, hedge funds and 
private equity firms not so much for their financial acumen, but for the potential that their 
rolodex, relations, and connections (and perhaps Facebook friends) bring to these firms. In 
short, potential connections are widely valued, but to become actually valuable this potential 
for connection value needs to be activated and used. We are not proposing that the practice 
of building social capital via rolodexes or Facebook contacts is new, but that it is important 
to recognize that a design principle is embedded in such an established practice and that 
attending to the embedded design principle can make a difference in performance and in 
effectiveness. One way in which this principle is articulated is to design the potential into the 
value creation formula of a network of actual and potential co-producers.  
 Actor-Network Theory (ANT) helps in understanding this. In ANT an ‘actant’ has a 
specific definition as a potential actor, which over the trajectory of becoming, usually 
becomes an ‘actor’ (Latour, 2005). Actors work hard with those in the network that they 
sustain and which sustains them to develop, transform, and keep their role, identity and 
position. For example, in its trajectory of development from the Model T to its present form, 
a car is now an actor that constrains and directs the activities of a huge network of actors 
that also define it: drivers, mechanics, insurers, pedestrians, traffic wardens, city planners, 
etc. Many of these actors started out as relationships, as offerings linking two pre-existing 
actors (like the client and the manufacturer). Over time the offering itself (the car in this 
example) becomes an actor that acts upon the actors it links. Inter-organizational activities 
that have retained ‘actant’, or potential, characteristics while at the same time exhibiting 
‘actor’, or actualized, ones have been remarkably successful. The VISA payment club 
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(Ramirez and Wallin, 2000) and Airbus (remarkably, until each was constituted as a single 
company) are examples.  
 In the industrial ‘actor only’ perspective, value creation is conceived in terms of 
commercial transactions where one can only win or lose, that is, in terms of competitive 
relations at each stage in a value chain. Its focus is on the supplier, who maximizes the rent 
it can appropriate by being the sole value producer. Clients are considered to destroy rather 
than produce value when they consume it. In contrast, the co-producer perspective outlined 
above focuses on the network and on enhancing value production jointly for as many of the 
players involved as possible in a value constellation. For the purposes of this paper, a value 
constellation is a useful way of conceptualizing co-produced trans-organizational work 
systems, as discussed below. While inequality in economic transactions clearly exists, the 
win/win logic in this perspective profits everyone. The differences between these 
perspectives were summarized by Ramirez (1999) as in Table 1.  
 
- insert Table 1 about here - 
 
 
 This distinction opens the way to a third design principle. One may envision the 
design of a value constellation from the point of view of any one player in three ways: (a) 
the design of the player within; (b) the design of the relations of the player with other players 
now; and (c) the design of the potential relations the player can have with players which it is 
not currently related to, as well as new relations it develops with players it is already related 
to. Let us examine them in turn, first using a simple mechanical example, then introducing 
some social messiness. 
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a) Consider the player as a single, independent, non-divisible entity or “part” that has 
only one function in the system of which it is a part. The design principle here 
suggests that if the function the player/part performs were to be removed from the 
system, the player/part would itself be removed from the system. In the case of a 
wheel and axle this is what happens if one of eight bolts holding the wheel to the 
axle is removed; seven such bolts still hold the wheel securely. System effectiveness 
remains acceptable for most purposes (perhaps not for the Paris-Dakar rallye). In 
Emery’s (1967) design terms the functional redundancy that the system has 
assigned to the part is built into the part entirely, and when the function is made 
redundant, the player/part is removed. In the same way, if the part is removed (e.g., 
the bolt falls off) the functionality it brought to the system is no longer available to the 
system. This is what Emery (1967) called Design Principle 1 (DP1) – the redundancy 
is built into the part. Its key property is “subjective seriality, in which ‘the governing 
relation is asymmetrical dependence. The sharing of parts is necessary to one of the 
parts but not to both’ (Feibleman and Friend, 1969: 36)” (Emery, 1976/1993: 214). 
b) Consider the player as a single, non-divisible entity or “part” still having only one 
function in that system, but now inter-dependent with other parts. Its leaving the 
system would affect other players, for it co-produces value with them. In the 
example, if the bolt in question leaves the system (is made redundant), and if the 
design principle in (a) above were operating, then the seven remaining bolts would 
have to take up 1/8
th
 more of the load; but the wheel would become less balanced, 
reducing the overall system effectiveness. To prevent this, one could ‘over-design’ 
the carry load of each of the eight bolts, such that if any one of them were to fall off, 
the other seven would use their full potential, taking up the load of the missing one 
so that wheel balance is maintained and system effectiveness remains acceptable. 
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This extra strength built into each of the eight bolts, which they do not use if all bolts 
remain attached, is built into the collection of bolts. This is what Emery called Design 
Principle 2 (DP2) – the redundancy is built into the function, not into a single part, 
and is shared among the parts.  
 Emery extended this situation from a single function to multiple functions, 
making each part capable of performing more than one function. The collection of 
parts/players grouped around a set of functions they could share was thus semi-
autonomous; it could internalize the regulation of those functions and link them with 
those of other such semi-autonomous groups. Its key property is “complementary 
seriality, in which ‘the governing relation is symmetrical dependence. The sharing of 
parts is necessary to both of the parts. Neither part can survive separation…’ 
(Feibleman and Friend, 1969: 36)” (Emery, 1976/1993: 214). 
 Merrelyn Emery (personal communication) considers that this second design 
principle includes the possibility to accept both new functions and new parts/players. 
Thus, if a bolt maker were to introduce an innovative “intelligent” bolt with a built-in 
sensor that indicates when one might break down, that failed condition would be 
signaled to a computer aboard the vehicle (cf. an existing tire of Michelin). A wheel-
axle propulsion system designed according to DP2 could easily accept the new type 
of bolt and could link to the on-board computer in ways it had not done before.  
 It is possible to take a step beyond situation (b). In both situations above, 
redundancy is located either within an existing part of a system (a), or within the system and 
distributed among the parts of the system (b). We indicated the design principle associated 
with each situation. Now we want to envision a third situation, where redundancy is located 
outside the system as it is currently constituted, both materially and temporally. The 
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redundancy includes the ability to take on functions which do not exist within the system at 
the present time. What is the design principle associated with such a situation? 
c) Consider the player in situation (b) – a single, non-divisible, interdependent entity – 
but in the future and a “part” of two systems, not just one. In the co-producer 
perspective of value creation, it is the actant (potential player), not the already 
constituted actor, that matters. Design here focuses not on the part itself (DP1) nor 
on the system of which the part is currently a member (DP2), but on the relations 
that the system of which the part is a member might have in the future with existing 
other parts/players or potential new parts/players. In the example, the relevant 
design principle might attend to regulatory frameworks that the bolt and its wheel-
axle propulsion system might be subject to in the future, or to the pollution produced 
in the environment in which the vehicle operates. 
 An example of this situation occurred recently in the white-goods sector in 
Denmark. A new demand external to that sector is the effect of the nation’s energy 
conservation priorities. Instead of retrofitting more energy efficient parts into old 
white goods, a Danish utility ordered the wholesale disposal of them, and offered its 
customers brand new models whose energy efficiency helped the utility to avoid 
building two new power plants. The design principle applicable to such situations 
introduces a temporal dimension into system design by projecting parts, functions 
and whole systems into potential and broader future contexts. We call this third 
design principle Redundancy of Potentialities and introduce it in the next two 
sections.  
 One may question the mechanical example above because it neglects the social 
messiness that inevitably occurs in the “real world” for which the design principles were 
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conceived
2
. An educational example may mollify this critique. Consider a classroom of 
students as the analogue of the wheel-axle system, with each student equivalent to a bolt. 
The DP1 situation outlined in (a) is a traditional classroom in a school governed by 
command-and-control principles. The behaviours of the students and teacher in the 
classroom are prescribed by rules and policies over which they have little control. The DP2 
situation outlined in (b) is a collaborative classroom characterized by project work, shifting 
roles and bringing the real world into the classroom through various kinds of projects and 
demonstrations. The teacher and perhaps the students have considerable discretion in 
designing pedagogical approaches and subject content. The DP3 situation outlined in (c) is 
an open-ended, seamless learning arena in which the students’ and teacher’s lives are 
framed as a joint learning project. There is no boundary between learning settings and the 
rest of life. Physical gatherings of the students and teacher are intended and designed to 
facilitate reflection on life’s lessons in partnership with relevant stakeholders. 
 
4. THE EMERY DESIGN PRINCIPLES: WHAT THEY MEAN, WHAT THEY CAN DO 
 The Emery design principles function as follows: 
 “Each design principle produces a different set of outcomes in terms of productivity, 
learning and innovation, organizational effectiveness, power relations and other 
organizational factors. The logic is that (1) one of these principles underlies the 
explicit design of every workplace; (2) recognition of alternative design principles can 
lead to the explicit re-design of workplaces; and (3) such re-redesigns would have 
potentially profound consequences on the capabilities and competencies that derive 
from many organizational processes” (Selsky et al., 2005: 18). 
                                                 
2 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this addition. 
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 The two original design principles sprang from the socio-technical “level” of social 
ecology (see Baburoglu, 1992) and were developed in the context of routine factory and 
office work. They were seen as the complete set of ways by which people in organizations 
did and could relate to each other in terms of the organization, coordination and control of 
their work behavior. Writ large, the application of a given design principle in an organization 
produces a certain design configuration, consisting of its structure, tasks, reward systems, 
information flows, decision making processes and other arrangements. It also has 
implications for the distribution of authority and power that derive from such arrangements 
(Hirschhorn et al., 2001; Barton et al., 2004). That is,  
“In DP1 responsibility for coordination and control is located at least one level above 
where the work, learning, or planning is being done.  DP1 yields a supervisory or 
dominant hierarchy… In DP2 responsibility for coordination and control is located 
with the people performing the task… A change of design principle is systemic and 
will ultimately require the redesign of all subsystems. For formal, employing 
organizations, the design principles are embedded in industrial relations legalities…” 
(M. Emery, 2000: 627-628). 
 Some researchers have considered and adapted the original design principles for 
new contexts. For instance, Pava (1983) adapted and applied DP2 to non-routine office 
work and Hirschhorn (1984, 2001) took up this effort. Trist (1983b/1993: 664) called for a 
“new conceptual language” in new socio-technical system applications, and pointed to 
Pava’s work. He identified new analytical categories to use in a socio-technical system 
analysis when work is non-routine and interdependency among potential work groups is 
“saturated.” He considered these categories to be deliberations and discretionary coalitions 
(ibid.: 665-666). Hirschhorn et al. (2001) amplified this line of thought in “mass 
customization” settings, that is, settings where experimentation and learning rather than 
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controlled production are the primary task. In a rethinking of the usual socio-technical 
system analysis, Hirschhorn et al. articulated new “design principles” for the role system, 
the skill base and functional redundancy in such settings.  
 When the analysis is raised to the field level, the function of a design principle (to 
deliver effective work behavior and governance) remains the same; but it makes more 
visible the existence of work units spanning across organizational boundaries (see Sinha 
and Van de Ven, 2005; Cummings, 1984). Examples of such work units include global 
supply chains, value constellations and strategic partnerships to jointly produce a new 
consumer offering. Hence, whereas DP1 corresponds with hierarchical and bureaucratic 
design and DP2 corresponds with participative design, we argue that DP3 is at the core of 
designing trans-organizational work systems that are future responsive.  
 This moves the design of work systems beyond what DP2 affords. DP2 is meant to 
deliver creative work behavior by embedding control and coordination within the work unit 
itself. The search conference, a participatory planning methodology geared explicitly to 
DP2, illustrates that DP2 can be and has been extended to extra-organizational situations 
(M. Emery, 2000: 628). Search conferences are intended to be “learning environment[s, in 
which] members work and learn together around system futures” (M. Emery, 1999: 112). 
More generally, Merrelyn Emery (1999: 111) claims that   
“Redundancy of functions [DP2] refers not only to technical skills but to all of the 
peculiarly human characteristics of conscious planning and goal setting, measuring 
and analyzing within cycles of decision making… People within DP2 structures are 
free and motivated to merge their experiential knowledge from all sources, the 
external social field, their various task environments, their histories and their abstract 
learnings into new creative syntheses.” 
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 Whilst we agree with Emery, we find that DP2 tends to be focused more within the 
organization, aimed at delivering a design for effective work behavior in it. We argue in the 
next section that DP2 does not adequately explain the kinds of interorganizational 
collaboration that we are seeing in many industries and fields around the world today. 
Moreover, DP2 fails to  embrace adequately the ecology of organizations around any one 
socio-technical system,  nor does it focus on potential (for the future) connectivity.  
 Interestingly, Merrelyn Emery’s quote above calls attention to an aspect of the 
design principles which can easily be neglected. Those principles are commonly understood 
as having to do with the operations of a work system (at team, divisional and organizational 
levels), and have implications for governance and power at each of those levels. That is, the 
design principles are widely seen as operational-level principles; they deal mostly with 
internal behaviors and relationships, and to a much lesser extent with the transactional 
environment. 
 However, work systems are not designed in a vacuum; work system design is done 
for some purpose, such as a strategic goal. Indeed, in most conventional strategy 
textbooks, organization design is framed as strategy implementation. Thus, DP1 yields a 
design for the purpose of control relative to an organization’s strategy, and DP2 yields a 
design for the purpose of autonomy relative to the strategy (see Keidel, 1990). 
 Now in a turbulent context the contextual environment becomes a much more 
important consideration in strategy than in “normal” competitive contexts (Selsky et al., 
2007; Ramirez et al., 2008), because the contextual environment can intrude into the 
transactional environment of an organization and thence affect both the organization’s 
internal operations and its ability to strategize effectively. Emery and Trist’s suggested 
response to a turbulent environment, collaborative endeavors, means that organizations 
seek to work collaboratively with others to push back against this intrusion of the contextual 
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environment. Essentially, players try to enlarge the boundary of the system (organization), 
in collaboration with others, to take in some of its transactional environment and to push the 
contextual environment away (Ramirez and van der Heijden, 2007). If successful, the 
collaboration stabilizes conditions for the participants. How might they do this? Emery’s 
quote above points to the wide distribution of knowledge in DP2 arrangements. We can 
extend this to the transorganizational work system created by the collaboration, and we can 
also note that this distributed knowledge may be strategy-relevant, not simply operational or 
inward-focused. When organizations in the same field collaborate in response to shared 
turbulent conditions, strategy becomes a more inclusive process than in a non-turbulent 
context. This is because the transorganizational work system contains multiple sources of 
knowledge about the contextual environment that may be strategy-relevant, and also 
because the realm of interactons that the system can leverage for strategic purposes is 
expanded. In effect, a work system designed so that this distributed knowledge can be 
brought to bear on the contextual environment expands the transactional environment and 
decreases the uncertainty that remains in the contextual environment accordingly.  
 This is where the need for a third design principle becomes evident. DP3 yields an 
explicit, testable, and examinable design for potentiality, that is, the future potential of the 
organization and its relations with others relative to its strategy considered from a future 
point of view. We believe this reframing of the design principles as strategic-level principles 
and not just operational ones makes them particularly relevant to today’s challenges. 
 
5. DESIGN PRINCIPLE THREE  
5.1. System Requirements  
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 What would such a re-framed design principle look like? The design requirements of 
situations (as in (c) above) for DP3 to be operative are as follows: 
 First, the set of actors in a social field are able to constitute and re-define that field, 
not just function within it. This includes the ability to enlarge the transactional part of the 
field, as discussed above. Recall that a social field consists of a set of systems, transactions 
among them and their relevant environments. A set of actors forms and organizes a social 
field out of an unorganized network of actual and potential connections. That is, the field 
unfolds from a latent or enfolded state as potentialities are activated (Bohm, 1996; Morgan, 
2006) by the actors, converting actants into actors and relations into offerings that then 
become actors in their own right, as described above. In social ecology terms, the actors 
are active subjects of the field with a capacity for active adaptation.
3
 Examples are those 
linking parties involved in the fight against poverty; or agencies working together after the 
2004 South Asian tsunami; or software developers collaborating on Linux (Weber, 2004). In 
these examples actors do more than self-control and auto-coordination; they dynamically 
co-produce, build or develop the very field that they constitute. This implies that the actors 
must have a sense of the possible future states of the field which may emerge from their co-
production; we explain why below.  
 Second, a wide set of potential inter-organizational connections exist in the field and 
are imagined by some actors in it. In DP1 and DP2 the relevant criteria centre upon control 
and coordination of existing work systems. DP3 extends the design criteria to building in the 
potential for relating and/or connecting with a broader set of entities in the field that are not 
yet linked and which may not be aware of each other. The control and coordination is aimed 
at enhancing the possible future regulation of the field and the linkages constituting the field. 
Thus, the focus in DP3 moves from the current set of actors, the linkages among them and 
                                                 
3 That is, they are purposeful (Ackoff and Emery, 1972; Ackoff, 1999).  
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their governance to a broader and more diverse set of potential linkages among a broader 
potential set of actors and their governance.  
 Third, at least one value constellation spans across the boundaries of two or more 
organizations in the field. The actors in the field create a trans-organizational work system, 
that is, a system of two or more organizations plus arrangements (e.g., division of labour, 
authority relations, decision rules) designed to produce some output jointly. A value 
constellation is an example of such a work system, such as the Android-centred one 
supported by Google and the iPhone-centred one supported by Apple in the global 
smartphone industry. DP1 and DP2 can be applied across the boundaries of organizations 
because socio-technical systems form around natural work units, and natural work units 
may consist of members from multiple organizations. Examples include joint ventures, 
construction projects that involve subcontracting, and global supply-chain arrangements 
(Sinha and Van de Ven, 2005; see also Motamedi, 2012). However, in an era where 
innovation may be ‘open’ (Chesbrough, 2003) and ‘boundaryless’ structures and relational 
capital may be crucial to strategic success (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), the locus of 
capability building shifts from intra-organizational relations to inter-organizational field 
relations (see Selsky et al., 2007; Pascal et al., 2012). The design principle underlying these 
relations needs to take this shift into account. We believe DP3 does so in ways that DP1 
and DP2 do not. 
 
5.2. Redundancy of Potentialities 
 Potentials are options that might become available to actors to be exercised; they 
are not (yet) options that can be exercised. A potentiality may exist for a long time, or it may 
be short-lived. It is likely that all open systems have this feature of latent potentials built-in, 
and hence they are redundant. To be consistent with the terminology of the Emery design 
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principles we call this feature of DP3 the Redundancy of Potentialities (RoP). It involves the 
actors’ aspirations and fears of what the field that they constitute might become in its 
context and in relation to other fields.   
 RoP is shown in an empirical study of the fast-changing nanotechnology industry. In 
that industry Meyer et al. (2005) found that “a... startup doesn’t construct an alliance 
network – the startup’s alliance network constructs the nascent firm” (p468). Essentially this 
means that the nanotechnology field is implicitly designed with many potential connections. 
Under some conditions some of these connections coalesce into a firm that at birth has a 
ready-made network of alliance partners and other connections.  
 Can this emergent process be improved upon by deliberately designing a field to 
catalyze its potentialities for creative collaboration, and if so, how?  
 This is the promise of DP3, to enhance the strategic capabilities of value 
constellations, trans-organizational work systems and other types of inter-organizational 
fields, not those of single firms. This is not what DP2, with its main focus on the single 
organization, is geared to deliver. RoP does this by instilling excess capacity for connectivity 
in a field (or in an unorganized network that has the potential to become a field, as in the 
first system requirement above). It aims at creating, developing and/or activating new links 
between and among organizations inhabiting or potentially inhabiting a field or network. This 
occurs as the actors continually constitute the field/network by imagining, devising, testing, 
prototyping, and conducting their relationships on an ongoing basis. New competencies and 
capabilities may develop from these links. Le Masson, Weil and Hatchuel’s (2010) approach 
to innovation and design illustrates this. Their design approach explicitly ‘reaches out’ to 
ignorance with multiple prototype-centred iterations to link known capabilities with known 
ignorances, trying to map each better in each iteration. Untraded and unlicensed patents 
that may be resting in corporate R&D files is another example (Rivette and Kline, 1999). 
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 In DP3 mode, a designer working with an existing value constellation attends to how 
changes in the wider context may affect the potential collaborations s/he may want to make. 
Thus, a field such as a value constellation designed according to DP3 is future-oriented; its 
designers have images of its possible future states. In those futures some of today’s 
potentialities would have been (in that future) activated and actualized. Thus, while 
designing-in RoP must be done on a specific field in the present, it is done for potential 
value constellations whose decision makers want to imagine potential links and consider 
which of these they may want to enact in the future to enhance the constellation’s adaptive 
capacity in its context (e.g., its competitive advantage vis-à-vis other constellations). DP3 
deals with questions of ‘what if’ and ‘what might,’ that is, questions of possibility, risk and 
opportunity. What might happen includes the unforeseen and not immediately identifiable 
constellations in the field’s interstitial spaces, but it is centred on the imaginable. DP3 
involves rehearsing the future, not to ‘future proof’ the present, but to produce viable value 
constellations today that are better able to become responsive to the future (Normann, 
2000). From a DP1 and DP2 perspective DP3 puts the locus of control and coordination in 
possible futures; but from a DP3 perspective RoP design opens up spaces for linkages that 
would not be available with DP2 and DP1 and fosters innovation more explicitly than DP2. 
 Managers try to capture and deploy potentialities in terms of  capabilities which are 
tradable (Blois and Ramirez, 2006). In this sense DP3 embraces many well known types of 
public routines; e.g., plans and policies for evacuation in the event of natural disasters; 
medical plans for dealing with epidemics; or networks of open innovation or even 
collaborative consumption (Botsman and Rogers, 2010). In addition, many kinds of strategic 
corporate routines may manifest RoP design, such as risk assessment and mitigation, 
cooperative partnerships, strategic issues management, public relations, lobbying, and 
scenario planning. 
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 As discussed above, employers often pay a premium for connective potential in 
those they recruit. If one has a rich rolodex or is well connected (as senior political figures or 
public servants tend to be), headhunters will ensure that one’s new employer pays more 
than if one is unknown to potentially important colleagues. Similarly, good reputation, 
whether personal or corporate, is valued because it carries the potential for further positive 
or valuable connections. DP3 is what keeps alumni groups lively, and why universities and 
consulting firms, famously McKinsey, invest so much in promoting their vitality. Essentially 
such investments represent strategists’ desire and choice to build the potentiality into the 
firm or university as an important player in an ongoing working field. In doing so they are 
acting in accordance with the RoP design of DP3, whereas DP2 and DP1 do not capture 
this aspect of design. 
 
6. ILLUSTRATIONS 
 We offer two brief illustrations of DP3: ‘bazaar’ governance in the open-source 
software community; and catalytic organizations in institutional fields.  
 
6.1. Governance in Open-Source Software 
 Demil and Lecocq (2006) used the open-source software community as a case for 
inductively identifying a new form of governance, which they call bazaar governance. They 
identify characteristics of this form which are associated with creative collaboration, 
including anonymity of contributors/participants, non-excludability, free riding and unequal 
contributions.  
 Bazaar governance resonates with our characterization of DP3, as follows. Hargrave 
and Van de Ven (2006: 873-874) conclude that “[o]pen source software developers meet 
greater success by 'running in packs' than by going it alone.” The open source software 
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community is explicitly and strategically designed by means of a specific “governance 
institution” to activate potentials to improve software products through affordances for 
collaboration among the developers. That institution is the open source license (Demil and 
Lecocq, 2006); it specifies property rights for developers of software innovations, but 
constrains those rights by requiring open publication of the innovation’s source code.  
 In the open source community the actors are the ‘free-agent’ software developers 
and they constitute the field. They activate linkages among themselves as they work on 
specific problems encountered or innovations dreamed up. In this way they create 
temporary work systems across traditional proprietary boundaries. At any particular time 
many linkages in the community remain latent. Thus, RoP is built into the open-source 
community as a field-level strategic capability, and the design of the field is emergent in the 
sense described in Section 7 below. Wikipedia is another example of this design principle in 
action.  
 The issue of free riding in such governance arrangements is important, for free riders 
also represent potentiality in a system. However, it is a potentiality for creative shirking, not 
creative collaboration. Usually free riding is considered problematic in collaborative arenas 
(e.g., Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990). Yet, although von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) 
discovered massive free riding in the open-source software community, they found it was 
not a problem in terms of performance of the overall field. The massive redundancy in the 
field, namely, the productive and creative capacity of an army of potential software 
developers, appeared to create more than enough potential in the field to overcame the 
usual drag of free riding. Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) also offer a cogent description of 
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the free rider problem and show how the usual explanations are overturned in cases of 
open source software.
4
 
 
6.2. Catalytic Organizations 
 The Paris Club is an insititution for rescheduling government-to-government debt 
(Paris Club, 2006). There is no physical office for the Paris Club; it is called the Paris Club 
because the meetings are held in Paris. The French Treasury acts merely as the secretary 
for this institution only when a country (usually a less developed one) cannot meet its 
oligations to a creditor country(ies). The creditor countries are bound by a set of 
gentlemen’s rules that amount to no unilateral action on the debtor nation and a system of 
interventions mediated by the World Bank and the IMF in order to bring the debtor nation 
back to the international finance system without causing a major international crisis.   
 The Paris Club is a design manifestation of DP3. It embodies a potential which is 
unlimited regarding the number of “cases” it can absorb. It satisfies the three requirements 
for DP3 to be operative. That is, the members of the Paris Club, well-off creditor countries 
like Germany and France, are able to act upon the field and change the rules governing the 
Club if necessary. In addition, all creditor and debtor countries participating in the Club are 
potentially connected to each other. Finally, the set of rules for settling inter-nation debts 
enables the Club to function as a distinct value constellation.  
 A body that functions in a similar way is a consortium of diverse biotechnology 
organizations in an Australian state (Marot et al., 2005). The purpose of this consortium is to 
                                                 
4 ‘Open’ and ‘free’ fields have expanded much in recent years. Following on the heels of such 
celebration of open sourcing come critiques from adjacent fields, e.g., ‘traditional’ newspapers 
whose content – hard-won and expensive – is being pilfered by bloggers, news consolidators 
like Google, etc. See Anderson (2009). Perhaps this is the dark side of DP3. 
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forge linkages among the organizations in order to broker specific funded projects and 
create collective capacity to win funded research contracts in the future. Selsky et al. (2005) 
used this case to build understanding of collaborative capability at a field level. They 
suggested that collaborative capability could be explored “as a potentially designable field-
level dynamic process [that] has important implications for managing innovation more 
holistically” (p19). Cases like this are manifestations of DP3, embracing RoP to the extent 
that they focus on future as well as current inter-organizational collaboration and how to 
build out collaborative capacity for innovation from the existing base.  
  We call bodies such as the Paris Club and the Australian biotech consortium 
catalytic organizations. They serve the catalytic function in their respective fields only when 
called for and when needed by the organizations or individuals that need the adaptive 
capacity that the catalytic organization can provide. They may be considered latent referent 
organizations (Trist 1983a).
5
 The design prinicple underpinning such trans-organizational 
work systems has strategic and not just operational implications. 
 
7. IMPLICATIONS 
 This study has important implications for both the analysis and design of trans-
organizational work systems. Regarding analysis, DP3 is offered as a new tool for the 
analysis of inter-organizational fields. Some scholars view inter-organizational fields as 
emergent outcomes of the actions of many actors, not overseen by single designers who 
                                                 
5 Trist (1983a) found referent organizations to be the de facto ‘rule makers’ of  fields, not by 
‘hard’ law (Medjad) but through ‘soft’ law influences that come to be adopted. Ramirez and 
Wallin (2000) relabelled them ‘prime movers’, and analyzed how companies such as Tetra Pak, 
Visa, Nokia, and Xerox have acted as referent organizations and have been the de facto 
designers of their respective fields. We use the working term 'catalytic organization' rather than 
a referent organization because it concerns a latent function that comes to be seen by third 
parties only when it unfolds (Bohm, 1996). Nevertheless, the proper relationship between 
referent organizations and our term remains to be worked out. 
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can impose order on an entire field (e.g., Selsky et al., 2005: 20; Hargrave and Van de Ven, 
2006; Aldrich, 1999). Others see a ‘prime mover’ that deliberately designs and shapes a 
value constellation (e.g., Normann and Ramirez, 1991; Iansiti and Levien, 2004). Deliberate 
designs at the field level are visible in several ways: in government regulations to steer 
industries and shape the behaviour of actors in them; in the attempts of public and 
corporate foundations to steer the evolution of ideas in the philanthropic fields in which they 
operate (see Gilmore et al., 2007); and in the “ecologies” of private and public organizations 
working together to stimulate “complex innovation” to address societal problems (Dougherty 
and Dunne, 2011). 
 Another analysis related implication is that the locus of innovation and learning from 
a DP3 perspective is seen to be the field of connections, and not the ‘ideas’ or ‘creativity’ 
that executives may try to stimulate solely within their organizations, as conventional 
‘closed-source’ innovation theorists suggest (Dougherty and Dunne, 2011). This is 
consistent with Selsky et al.’s (2007) proposition that in turbulent environments the locus of 
strategic advantage is the field, not the individual firm. The not yet unfolded network and the 
potential connectivity that resides there contains potential capabilities and stimulates 
innovation in new communities of practice (cf. Hirschhorn et al., 2001: 249; Brown and 
Duguid, 1996; Wenger, 1998). 
 Moving to implications for the practice of designing, this study enriches 
understanding of design at a field level in several ways. It highlights that whether emergent 
or deliberate, the way some fields are designed does catalyze or enable creative 
collaboration, and does stimulate potentialities for it. However, the design of other fields 
promotes or catalyzes other processes, such as competition, conflict, and/or the status quo 
of prevailing institutions. This is why we argue that DP3 is a distinct design principle and 
that the design principles have strategic-level importance. For example, a designer in (or of) 
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a field may wish to dampen competitive processes and promote collaborative ones In order 
to forestall turbulence in the contextual environment. 
 Thus, this study is to understand how actors in fields may make choices to activate 
field potentialities. The role of leading, prime-mover firms is crucial (Ramirez and Wallin, 
2000; Iansiti and Levien, 2004). In addition, Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006: 873-874) 
point to the pivotal role of institutional entrepreneurs who may work a field, “undertak[ing] a 
stream of activities to gain the resources, competencies, and endorsements necessary to 
develop an economically viable enterprise”. When the activities of these entrepreneurs 
intersect, they “provide occasions for recognizing areas for establishing cooperative and 
competitive relationships...” (ibid.: 874; see also Fleming and Wasguespack, 2007).   
 DP3 becomes visible by uncovering sources of potential connectivity lying latent in a 
network. When potential connections are activated, that part of the network becomes a 
working transorganizational system. One can think of DP3 as enabling an open-ended 
trajectory of constantly expanding potentialities. However, at any particular time these 
potentialities may be bounded or limited by the DP2 and/or DP1 characteristics of some 
players in the field. Thus, some potentialities may be closed off for periods of time by certain 
system design configurations based on DP1 or DP2. For example, Stelios Haji-Ioannou 
could not open up EasyJet as a viable commercial venture in Europe until European air 
travel had been liberalized. Historically that field was deeply rooted in DP1-based bilateral 
deals among countries. The mid-1990s liberalization allowed Stelios to import a version of 
SouthWest Airlines’ design and strategy into the European market.  
 Finally, this study sheds light on field-level institutions. The design of a field, whether 
emergent or deliberate, is revealed in its institutions and how its stakeholders relate to each 
other through those institutions (e.g., in partnership, in competition). For example, in the 
Australian biotech field mentioned above, the consortium formed as a new institution to 
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organize and regulate interactions among the various stakeholders – universities, venture 
capital firms, research institutes, etc. In a health care case in Minnesota discussed in Selsky 
et al. (2007), a self-selecting group of hospital executives and state officials initiated a forum 
which undertook to redesign the state’s disjointed health care sector into integrated health 
systems to improve epidemiological outcomes. In our terms the biotech consortium and the 
healthcare forum were DP3-based governance institutions that promoted creative 
collaboration by enabling actors to relate in new ways as they co-created the future of their 
field. In contrast, the global proprietary software industry dominated by Microsoft appears to 
have institutions with the characteristics of DP1. Examining a field’s existing institutions and 
its built-in mechanisms for change, or its “generative mechanisms” (Pascal et al., 2012; see 
also Emery, 1999), may point to missing institutions (Perlmutter, 1965) or dysfunctional 
arrangements that might be redressed through redesign in order to promote creative 
collaboration (see also Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2006).  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 In this paper we have outlined how a socio-ecological design principle, redundancy 
of potentialities, might be used to explore and identify potential connections and capabilities 
residing in trans-organizational work systems. Arguably the need for creative collaboration 
is greater now than in the past due to the growing turbulence experienced by organizations. 
We have made the case that this newly uncovered design principle DP3 becomes salient 
when unprecedented collaboration is needed to address the interlinked global crises – from 
financial crises to ecological catastrophes – besetting the developed and developing worlds 
today. These crises are the drivers of the turbulence currently experienced. In turn, the 
need to engage turbulence compels a refocusing of the Emery design principles at a more 
strategic and inter-organizational level. 
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 Further research on DP3 might explore how it can be effectively built into an inter-
organizational field to stimulate new paths for creative collaboration. Our understanding of 
redundancy of potentialities is still in its infancy. Much research remains to be done to clarify 
its properties, range of applications, and implications for such issues as corporate social 
responsibility and power. 
 We believe that DP3 is not only suited to designing or redesigning inter-
organizational fields but to social fields at any ‘level’ – inter-organizational, organizational, 
team. Thus, we postulate that it is a multi-level design principle left undeveloped in the 
evolution of socio-ecological thinking. In this paper we have concentrated on perhaps its 
most obvious level of relevance, the inter-organizational social field. The recent explosion of 
collaborative relationships has made redundancy of potentialities more observable and 
salient but it is an essential design principle necessary for designing structures and 
processes broadly in the socio-ecological paradigm.
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Table 1. Two views of value production 
 
 
        INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE             CO-PRODUCTIVE PERSPECTIVE           . 
 
• Value creation is sequential, uni- • Value creation is synchronic, inter- 
   directionally transitive, best described    active, best described in ‘value 
   in ‘value chains’    constellations’ 
 
• All managed values can be measured • Some managed values cannot be 
   in monetary terms    measured or monetized  
• Value is added sequentially • Values are co-invented, combined and     
reconciled 
 
• Value is a function of utility and rarity • Exchange is the source of utility and rarity 
  
• Values are ‘objective’ (exchange) • Values are ‘contingent’ and ‘actual’ 
   and ‘subjective’ (utility)   (established interactively) 
 
• Customers destroy value • Customers (co-)create values 
 
• Value ‘realized’ at transaction, • Value is co-produced, with customer, 
  only for supplier (event)     over time - for both co-producers       
     (relationship) 
 
• Three-sector models pertinent • Three-sector models no longer pertinent 
 
• Services a ‘separate’ activity • Services a framework for all activities 
     considered as co-produced 
 
• Consumption not a factor of production • Consumers managed as factors of  
       production (assets) 
 
• Economic actors analyzed holding one • Economic actors analyzed as holding 
   primary role at a time    several different roles simultaneously 
 
• Firm and activity are units of analysis • Interactions (offerings) are unit of  
    analysis 
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